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Financial ties between leaders of influential US professional 
medical associations and industry: cross sectional study
Ray Moynihan,1 Loai Albarqouni,1 Conrad Nangla,1 Adam G Dunn,2 Joel Lexchin,3 Lisa Bero4
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE
To investigate the nature and extent of financial 
relationships between leaders of influential 
professional medical associations in the United States 
and pharmaceutical and device companies.
DESIGN
Cross sectional study.
SETTING
Professional associations for the 10 costliest disease 
areas in the US according to the US Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality. Financial data for 
association leadership, 2017-19, were obtained from 
the Open Payments database.
POPULATION
328 leaders, such as board members, of 10 
professional medical associations: American College 
of Cardiology, Orthopaedic Trauma Association, 
American Psychiatric Association, Endocrine Society, 
American College of Rheumatology, American Society 
of Clinical Oncology, American Thoracic Society, North 
American Spine Society, Infectious Diseases Society of 
America, and American College of Physicians.
MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES
Proportion of leaders with financial ties to industry 
in the year of leadership, the four years before and 
the year after board membership, and the nature and 
extent of these financial relationships.
RESULTS
235 of 328 leaders (72%) had financial ties to 
industry. Among 293 leaders who were medical 
doctors or doctors of osteopathy, 235 (80%) had ties. 
Total payments for 2017-19 leadership were almost 
$130m (£103m; €119m), with a median amount for 
each leader of $31 805 (interquartile range $1157 
to $254 272). General payments, including those 
for consultancy and hospitality, were $24.8m and 
research payments were $104.6m—predominantly 
payments to academic institutions with association 
leaders named as principle investigators. Variation 
was great among the associations: median amounts 
varied from $212 for the American Psychiatric 
Association leaders to $518 000 for the American 
Society of Clinical Oncology.
CONCLUSIONS
Financial relationships between the leaders of 
influential US professional medical associations and 
industry are extensive, although with variation among 
the associations. The quantum of payments raises 
questions about independence and integrity, adding 
weight to calls for policy reform.
Introduction
A growing body of evidence details the nature and 
extent of financial associations between health 
professionals and the pharmaceutical and device 
industries, and the impacts of that involvement on 
research integrity, medical education, and patient 
care.1-4 Studies have found that sponsored trials 
have more favourable outcomes for sponsors’ 
products,5 sponsored education is associated with 
higher prescribing of sponsors’ medicines,6 and 
guideline panels, which change and often expand 
disease definitions, are populated by doctors with 
extensive financial conflicts of interest.7 In response 
to concerns about this evidence, the creation of 
mandated transparency databases such as the United 
States Sunshine Act’s Open Payments system now 
enable more enhanced investigation of these financial 
relationships. Despite their influence over key aspects 
of medicine,8 the leaders of professional medical 
associations have received limited scrutiny about their 
relationships with industry.
Professional medical associations such as doctor’s 
colleges and societies play vitally important roles 
within healthcare systems. They represent health 
professionals, fund research, facilitate medical 
education, and produce guidelines that influence 
practice and set disease definitions. As one author 
observed, the influence of professional medical 
associations is “so wide-ranging, involving almost all 
aspects of medicine, that scientific integrity, objectivity, 
and independence are essential.”8 Although debate 
is ongoing about how close the relationship between 
professional medical associations and industry 
should be,8-10 there are a paucity of data on the 
relationships between industry and the leaders of 
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WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
Evidence exists of extensive financial ties between health professionals and 
industry across many domains of healthcare
Calls for more independence from industry in production and use of evidence are 
growing
Few data are available on financial ties between industry and leadership 
of professional medical associations that are influential across research, 
education, and practice, including guideline development
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
During 2017-19, leaders of 10 influential US professional medical associations 
received almost $130m (£103m; €119m) from industry during their year of 
leadership, the four years before, and the year after
80% of the US based medical doctors who lead influential professional medical 
associations had financial relationships with industry, with great variation in the 
size of median payments by association, ranging from $212 to $518 000
Against a backdrop of growing calls for financial independence from commercial 
interests, these findings show that for some doctors’ groups this will require 
major reform, whereas for others it will be relatively easy
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these associations.11 We undertook an analysis of 
the leadership across a sample of influential US 
professional medical associations, using the US 
government’s Open Payments database. Since 2013, 
this database has disclosed payments and transfers of 
value (collectively referred to as payments hereafter) to 
US based medical doctors and doctors of osteopathy 
from drug and device makers, across multiple 
categories, including research payments and general 
payments for consultancy, royalties, and hospitality.12
As concern and evidence about relationships 
between industry and professionals have grown, the 
integrally related problem of overuse of medical tests, 
diagnoses, and treatments has also attracted increasing 
attention. Estimates in the US suggest that at least 20% 
of healthcare spending might be wasted, including on 
overtreatment,13 and a report by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development on waste 
similarly estimates that 20% of health spending 
could be directed towards better use.14 In response, 
initiatives such as Choosing Wisely have emerged, and 
leading journals have launched campaigns such as 
Too Much Medicine, and Less is More, which includes 
annual systematic reviews of literature on medical 
overuse.15 A recent analysis identified commercial 
factors as one set of drivers of overdiagnosis, overuse, 
and overmedicalisation.16 As efforts to deal with the 
problem of too much medicine intensify, relationships 
between health professionals and industries interested 
in maximising markets are attracting more scrutiny.2 
In this study we identified and analysed the nature 
and extent of financial relationships between the 
leaders of a sample of influential professional medical 
associations in the US and drug and device makers. 
A secondary aim was to identify the extent to which 
recent guidelines from these associations mentioned 
concerns about overdiagnosis or overuse.
Methods
As per our protocol (see supplementary file) we 
conducted a cross sectional study of the financial 
relationships between pharmaceutical and device 
manufacturers and the leaders of influential US 
professional medical associations active across 
common costly disease areas.
Identifying disease areas and professional medical 
associations
We used the most recent US Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (2015) data to identify the top 
10 costliest disease areas in the US,17 based on a belief 
that this number would offer an important range 
of conditions. The costliest represent large disease 
burdens, such as cancer, and include areas with 
concerns about the potential existence of overdiagnosis 
and overuse.15
To identify a leading professional medical 
association—one that represents doctors and produces 
guidelines—for each of the 10 disease areas, we sought 
recommendations from three US based peers in each 
of the 10 disease areas. We identified professional 
medical associations led predominantly by doctors for 
doctors, rather than broader civil society organisations 
active within specific disease areas. Members of 
the authorship team identified peers and included 
those drawn from members of Cochrane Review 
Groups working in the relevant diseases and from an 
independent expert list (https://jeannelenzer.com/list-
independent-experts). An example of the request sent 
to expert peers is included in the supplementary file.
Identifying association leaders and those in Open 
Payments
Using published materials, including association 
websites and annual reports, two authors (RM, LA) 
independently identified the leaders of each identified 
medical association. Any discrepancies were resolved 
by discussion. Leaders were defined as members of 
the association’s overarching body or predominant 
leadership entity, such as a member of the board 
or governing council but not of subcommittees. We 
included members for the current year of service 
(2019) and two years previously.
For each included leader, two authors (RM, LA) 
then independently identified whether he or she 
appeared in the Open Payments database, which 
includes payments to medical doctors and doctors 
of osteopathy but does not include payment to other 
professionals, such as nurses. To ensure a correct 
match between the leader and the person identified 
in Open Payments, biographical information, such as 
name and affiliation, was compared. Discrepancies 
were resolved by discussion, and a unique URL link 
to Open Payments was prepared for each leader who 
appeared in that database. We also noted whether 
the association included publicly available financial 
disclosure information about leadership, together with 
the current listings of the leaders’ names.
Identifying and extracting payment details and 
companies
In line with World Health Organization and other 
guidance on relevant conflicts of interest,1 18 we 
identified any financial relationships an individual 
might have had in their current year of board 
membership (if membership was 2017-18, the current 
year was identified as 2017) and the four years 
before and one year after membership. By using the 
unique link for each leader identified by two authors 
independently, one author (CN) manually extracted 
data on payments (from April to September 2019) for 
the identified leaders who appeared in Open Payments, 
using categories within the database: chiefly general 
payments, research, associated research, and others, 
such as investments. General payments include but are 
not limited to consultancy, royalties, and hospitality. 
Research payments include those where the company 
making the payment names the individual doctor 
as primary recipient, and payments to institutions, 
where the doctor is named as a principal investigator 
on the research. We also downloaded the data from 
Open Payments directly into Excel spreadsheets, 
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which included the names of the companies making 
payments. A second author (RM) double checked the 
information from Open Payments for accuracy.
Identifying guidelines and mentions of 
overdiagnosis and overuse
For each association, two authors (RM, LA) 
independently identified up to three guidelines related 
to the relevant disease area. We identified guidelines 
with the highest combination of downloads (using 
journal website metrics) and citations (using Web 
of Science) for each of the three most recent years, 
when available. When no guidelines were available 
for a particular year, we chose the next most recent 
year. Discrepancies and uncertainties in identifying 
guidelines, including uncertainty about which 
guideline had the highest combination of citations and 
downloads, were resolved by discussion. We used a 
simple method to identify mentions of overdiagnosis 
and overuse in the guidelines, drawing on methods 
previously used by authors.7 Two authors (RM, plus 
one other author) independently identified whether 
mentions were explicit or used related terms, or were 
implicit, and whether any guideline recommendations 
had resulted from those mentions. This process was 
piloted with all authors using one guideline. Any 
discrepancies were resolved by discussion or referred 
to a third author.
Outcome measures
We investigated several primary outcomes. Firstly, the 
proportion of leaders with financial ties to industry in 
their current year of tenure, the previous four years, 
and the year after, contingent on data availability 
in Open Payments, in which the most recent year of 
disclosed payments was 2018. Secondly, the overall 
proportion of US based leaders who were medical 
doctors or doctors of osteopathy with financial ties, 
and the proportion within each organisation. Thirdly, 
the proportion of associations with no leaders with 
financial ties. Fourthly, among leaders with ties, the 
amount of payments (in dollars) overall and within 
three categories (general, research and associated 
research combined, other). Fifthly, the total amounts 
overall and for each association and each leader. 
Finally, the top three contributor companies (in dollar 
amounts) to each association’s leaders. A secondary 
outcome included the proportion of the three most 
widely used guidelines (by association for the target 
disease areas) explicitly or implicitly mentioning 
overdiagnosis or overuse, or both, and related issues.
Changes to protocol
Our protocol included a plan to investigate any changes 
in the extent or nature of financial ties over the study 
period, which we decided not to pursue given the 
short three year window. Our protocol did not include 
a plan to assess leaders by sex, but after noting large 
sex imbalances between some association leaders, we 
decided to include these data.
Patient and public involvement
There was no patient or public involvement in 
developing the research question, the analysis, or 
manuscript preparation for this study. An approach 
to a health consumer organisation seeking potential 
involvement in developing and running the research 
was unsuccessful.
Results
The 10 costliest disease areas in the US were heart 
disease, trauma related disorders, mental disorders, 
diabetes mellitus, osteoarthritis and other non-
traumatic joint disorders, cancer, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease and asthma, back problems, 
infectious diseases, and hypertension. Table 1 lists 
the identified professional medical associations. No 
association was clearly identified for hypertension. 
However, as some expert peers had suggested the 
American College of Physicians for other conditions, 
including back problems, diabetes, and for 
hypertension, it was decided to include this association 
in the list of 10 associations. 
Overall, 328 leaders were identified across the 
three most recent years of board membership of the 
associations. Using the Open Payments database, 235 
(72%) were found to have had any financial ties to 
industry within the year of membership, the four years 
before membership, and the year after membership. Of 
the 293 leaders who were medical doctors or doctors of 
osteopathy (only three), 235 (80%) had any financial 
ties to industry. No organisation had a leadership free 
of financial ties.
Table 1 shows the proportions of leaders with 
financial ties by association and payment category. 
Although for most associations more than 80% of 
their US based medical leaders had financial ties, 
the American College of Physicians had 66% and the 
American Psychiatric Association had 38% (fig 1).
Total payments of almost $129.9m ($130m, £103m; 
€119m) (median $31 805, interquartile range $1157 
to $254 272) were linked to the 235 leaders with 
financial ties (table 1). That total included almost 
$24.8m for general payments ($6026, $309 to 
$54 167), $104.6m for research ($0, $0 to $132 913), 
predominantly to institutions with leaders named as 
principle investigators, and $0.5m ($0, $0 to $0) for 
other payments.
The amounts of general payments and research 
payments varied widely (fig 2). Leaders of the North 
American Spine Society received more than $9.5m for 
general payments and those of the Orthopaedic Trauma 
Association received more than $4.7m, whereas leaders 
of the American College of Physicians received just 
over $400 000 and those of the American Psychiatric 
Association received around $129 000. Research 
payments linked to leaders of the American Society of 
Clinical Oncology were over $54m and for those of the 
American College of Cardiology, almost $21m, whereas 
for leaders of the American Psychiatric Association 
the figure was just over $216 000 and for those of the 
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American College of Physicians just under $168 000 
(fig 2).
Analysis of median total amounts linked to individual 
leaders also varied widely between associations (fig 3). 
The median was $518 000 for leaders of the American 
Society of Clinical Oncology and more than $251 000 
for those of the American College of Rheumatology 
compared with just $404 for leaders of the American 
College of Physicians and $212 for those of the 
American Psychiatric Association. Box 1 shows three 
examples of financial relationships between three 
leaders of professional medical associations and 
industry, reflecting the upper quartile, the median, 
and the lower quartile of payments for these three 
associations.
Supplementary table 1 shows the top three 
companies providing payments for each associations’ 
leadership and the amount of payments, ranging from 
almost $17m from Astra Zeneca to less than $30 000 
from Shire. Only two of the 10 associations had 
publicly available information about the relationships 
of leaders with industry accompanying their leadership 
list: American College of Rheumatology and American 
Society of Clinical Oncology. An unplanned analysis of 
leaders by sex showed that women comprised 122 of 
328 leaders (37%), ranging from 6% of the board of the 
North American Spine Society to 55% of the leadership 
of the Endocrine Society. Overdiagnosis, overuse, or 
associated problems were explicitly mentioned in six 
of 28 guidelines, implicitly mentioned in a further four, 
and these mentions were reflected in recommendations 
in seven (supplementary table 1).
Discussion
Almost three quarters of the leaders of 10 influential 
professional medical associations in the US, 
representing and educating doctors working across 
the most common and costliest disease areas, had 
financial relationships with pharmaceutical and device 
manufacturers. Based on analysis of publicly available 
payment data for the year of service as a leader and 
the four years before and one year after membership, 
leaders of the associations were linked to payments 
totalling almost $130m from industry. The median 
amount for each leader across this timeframe was more 
than $31 000. Results also indicate strong variation 
in the amount of payments among associations, with 
median amounts for each leader varying from $212 for 
the American Psychiatric Association to $518 000 for 
the American Society of Clinical Oncology. The largest 
research payments flowed to leaders of the American 
Society of Clinical Oncology ($54m) and the American 
College of Cardiology ($21m). The largest general 
payments—which can include fees for consultancy, 
speaking, royalties, and other payments—were given to 
leaders of the North American Spine Society ($9.5m) 
and the Orthopaedic Trauma Association ($4.7m).
Limitations and strengths of this study
This study has important limitations. We relied solely 
on the US government’s Open Payments database, T
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although arguably this is the most comprehensive 
and reliable source for financial payments. Without 
any objective list available, identifying associations 
to match the 10 costliest disease areas was mostly 
straightforward, although in some cases uncertain, and 
we make no claim that the 10 associations identified are 
the definitive list of the most influential. We explicitly 
excluded not-for-profit civil society organisations with 
broader remits, such as the American Heart Association 
and American Diabetes Association, focusing instead 
on associations led predominantly by medical doctors 
for doctors, which limits generalisability of findings. 
Owing to data availability, a complete set of payments 
is not yet available for leaders in 2018 and 2019, 
suggesting our results underestimate the total amount 
of payments. In three cases we were unable to find a 
leadership list for an association for a specific year, 
further adding to underestimation. And finally, our 
simple checking of guidelines for any mention of 
overdiagnosis or overuse made no judgments about 
guideline quality and was merely using a surrogate 
marker for the extent to which popular guidelines are 
dealing with these health challenges. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, this study investigated the extensive 
financial relationships between the leaders of a sample 
of influential US professional medical associations and 
industry, derived from an objective list of a broad range 
of disease areas and subjective practical expert advice.
Comparison with other studies
Currently, few data exist on financial ties of leaders 
of professional medical associations. One similar 
although limited study of leaders from Japan in 
2016, where payments for research were not then 
available, found that 87% of board members of 19 
medical associations received payments from industry 
totalling $6.5m.11 Other recent related research 
found that in 2014, 51% of US medical journal 
editors received general payments and 20% received 
research payments,19 with the highest median general 
payments in endocrinology ($7207, interquartile 
range $0 to $85 816) and cardiology ($2664; $0 to 
$12 912), whereas 87% of US gastroenterologists 
received industry payments in 2016 totalling more 
than $67m.20
Implications of this study
In our study, the extent of involvement between 
industry and leaders of influential professional 
medical associations adds weight to calls for more 
independence.1 As one author observed, given 
their essential role in “maintaining and promoting 
the quality of medical care” and in order to show 
“independence and integrity,” leaders of professional 
medical associations must be “free of all financial ties 
with industry,” which he argued is feasible.8 As others 
have observed, guidelines from these professional 
medical associations “frequently call for greater use of 
health care services,” 21 and financial independence 
from commercial interests is doubly desirable if we are 
to tackle the problems of overuse and overdiagnosis.22 
Although association board members rarely write their 
association guidelines, their leadership and influence 
guide the tone and approach for the entirety of their 
association’s work. Importantly, our study found the 
leadership of some professional medical associations, 
such as the American Psychiatric Association and 
American College of Physicians, to have significant 
numbers of members without ties, and those with 
ties generally only received negligible payments. This 
shows that financial independence from industry 
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Fig 1 | Proportion of leaders of professional medical associations with financial 
ties to industry. IDSA=Infectious Diseases Society of America; OTA=Orthopaedic 
Trauma Association; ACC=American College of Cardiology; ACR=American College of 
Rheumatology; ASCO=American Society of Clinical Oncology; NASS=North American 
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Fig 2 | General and research payments to leaders of 10 professional medical 
associations. General payments include for consultancies, travel, food, and beverages, 
and royalties. IDSA=Infectious Diseases Society of America; OTA=Orthopaedic 
Trauma Association; ACC=American College of Cardiology; ACR=American College of 
Rheumatology; ASCO=American Society of Clinical Oncology; NASS=North American 
Spine Society; ATS=American Thoracic Society; ES=Endocrine Society; ACP=American 
College of Physicians; APA=American Psychiatric Association
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is possible for these medical leaders, and that in 
many cases payments are so low they could easily be 
phased out entirely, with simple policy reform within 
associations.
Unanswered questions and conclusions
Major research questions remain unanswered about 
the financial relationships between professional 
medical associations and industry, the impacts on 
patient care, and the practicalities and potential value 
of reform to forge independence. Future research 
might investigate professional associations beyond 
the 10 studied here, and outside the US setting, and 
examine potential differences between primary care 
based groups and other specialties. With the advent 
of mandatory Sunshine Act style Open Payments 
databases in other nations, these relations could 
be tracked over time to help chart moves towards 
independence. Urgently needed are more detailed 
investigations of potential relationships between 
industry payments to associations, their leaders and 
guideline writers, and the nature of their guidelines, 
medical education,23 and advocacy on issues relevant 
to sponsors. Clearly, although there are growing calls 
for professional medical associations to sever ties 
with industry,24 nothing can or should compel them 
to do so. Conversely, as evidence on the extent of 
their ties grows, nothing should compel acceptance of 
their claims of independence or integrity. We support 
recommendations that doctors’ groups and their 
guideline writers become free of financial relationships 
with industry.24 Our study’s novel findings of enormous 
variation in the extent of these ties suggest that for 
some groups such independence will require time and 
major reform, whereas for others it will be quick and 
relatively easy.
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